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Chapter XVIII
Curious Exceptions?
Open Source Software and 
“Open” Technology
Alessandro Nuvolari
Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands
Francesco Rullani
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Italy
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 10 years,  open source software 
development has increasingly attracted the at-
tention of scholars in the fi elds of economics, 
management, and social sciences in general 
(for sociological contributions, see Himanen, 
Torvalds, & Castells, 2001; Weber, 2004; see 
Maurer & Scotchmer, 2006, for an account of the 
phenomenon from the economist’s perspective). 
ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to explore the differences and commonalities between open source software 
and other cases of open technology. The concept of open technology is used here to indicate various 
models of innovation based on the participation of a wide range of different actors who freely share 
the innovations they have produced. The chapter begins with a review of the problems connected to the 
production of public goods and explains why open source software seems to be a “curious exception” 
for traditional economic reasoning. Then it describes the successful operation of similar models of in-
novation (open technology) in other technological fi elds. The third section investigates the literature in 
relation to three fundamental issues in the current open source research agenda, namely, developers’ 
motivations, performance, and sustainability of the model. Finally, the fourth section provides a fi nal 
comparison between open source software and the other cases of open technology. 
Although the signifi cance of the software industry 
in modern economic systems can partially explain 
the increasing number of research contributions 
in this area, it is clear that the chief reason behind 
this growing interest is the fact that open source 
software development seems to represent a form 
of innovation process that challenges many facets 
of the current conventional wisdom concerning 
the generation of innovations in market economies 
(Lerner & Tirole, 2001). 
Copyright © 2007, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
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Traditionally, economists have considered 
technological knowledge as a public good, that is, 
a good endowed with two fundamental features: 
(a)  nonrivalry and (b)  nonexcludability. Nonrivalry 
states that when one actor consumes or uses the 
good, this does not prevent other actors from con-
suming or using it. Obviously, this does not hold for 
standard economic goods: If Paul eats the apple, it 
is clear that Nathan cannot eat the same apple. On 
the other hand, both Paul and Nathan can breathe 
the fresh air of the park. Nonexcludability refers 
to the fact that when technological knowledge is 
in the public domain, it is no longer possible to 
prevent other actors from using it. Again, while 
Paul may force Nathan to pay for the apple, he 
cannot (legally) prevent Nathan from breathing the 
fresh air of the park. The traditional economist’s 
viewpoint contends that market economies are 
characterized by a systematic underprovision of 
public goods as their production is, due to the 
two properties described above, not profi table 
for private fi rms. In these circumstances, the 
standard prescription is that governments should 
intervene, using tax revenues to supply directly 
the appropriate quantity of public goods. This 
reasoning is at the heart of the argument that is 
commonly used in making the case for the public 
support of scientifi c research (Nelson, 1959). It is 
worth noting that, historically, the allocation of 
public resources for the production of scientifi c 
knowledge has been organized around a rather 
particular institutional arrangement (“open sci-
ence”) capable of producing both incentives to 
create new knowledge and the public disclosure 
of scientifi c fi nding (Dasgupta & David, 1994).
Public funding, however, is not the only answer. 
Another solution put forward by the literature is 
based on the idea of inducing private fi rms to invest 
in the production of  technological knowledge by 
means of an artifi cial system of  property rights 
(Arrow, 1962). The most common example, in 
this respect, is the patent system. A patent assigns 
temporarily to its inventor the complete control 
of the new technological knowledge discovered. 
The rationale for this institutional device is 
straightforward: The prospect of the commercial 
exploitation of this temporary monopoly right will 
induce private fi rms to invest resources in inven-
tive activities, that is, in the production of new 
technological knowledge.
In this context, open source software represents 
a case of the production of new technological 
knowledge (high-quality computer programs) car-
ried out by individuals without any direct attempt 
of “appropriating” the related economic returns. 
Clearly, all this is at odds with the conventional 
wisdom summarized above. 
Recent research has, however, shown that the 
innovation process characterizing open source 
software is not an isolated case. Instead, at least 
since the industrial revolution, similar types of 
innovation processes have been adopted in other 
industries in different periods. Following Foray 
(2004), we will refer to these episodes as cases of 
“open technology” in order to stress their similar-
ity with open source software. It is worth warning 
the reader that in the literature, a variety of other 
terms and defi nitions such as “ collective invention” 
or “community based innovation” are frequently 
used.1 There is a growing awareness that these cases 
do not represent just “curious exceptions” to the 
traditional models of innovation based on public 
funding or on commercial exploitation by means of 
exclusive property rights. The aim of this chapter 
is to provide a compact overview of this literature 
and to compare these cases of open technology 
with open source software. Our belief is that this 
broader perspective can enrich our understanding 
of open source software.
BACKGROUND
 Open Technology: A Neglected 
Model of Innovation 
In a seminal paper, Robert C. Allen (1983) pre-
sented a detailed case study of technical change in 
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the iron industry of Cleveland (United Kingdom) 
during the period of 1850 to 1870. According to 
Allen, the Cleveland iron industry was character-
ized by a particular model of innovation, which 
he labeled collective invention. In the Cleveland 
district, iron producers freely disclosed to their 
competitors technical information concerning the 
construction details and performance of the blast 
furnaces they had installed. Information was nor-
mally shared both through formal (presentations 
at meetings of engineering societies, publication 
of design details in engineering journals, etc.) and 
informal channels (visits to plants, conversations, 
etc.). Additionally, new technical knowledge was 
not protected using patents so that competing fi rms 
could freely make use of the released information 
when they had to construct a new blast furnace. 
The consequence of this process of information 
sharing was that the blast furnaces of the district 
increased their performance very rapidly. Allen 
noted three essential conditions at the basis of 
the emergence of the collective-invention regime. 
The fi rst condition refers to the nature of the 
technology. In the period considered, there was 
no consolidated understanding of the working 
of a blast furnace. The best engineers could do 
when designing a new blast furnace was to come 
up with some design guidelines on the basis of 
previous experiences. Obviously, the sharing of 
information related to the performance of a large 
number of furnaces allowed engineers to rely on 
a wider pool of information in their extrapola-
tions, leading to a more rapid rate of technological 
progress. Second, blast furnaces were designed 
by independent consulting engineers who were 
normally employed on a one-off basis. In this 
context, the most talented engineers had a strong 
incentive to disseminate the successful design 
novelties they had introduced in order to enhance 
their professional reputation and improve their 
career prospects. Third, iron producers were often 
also owners of iron mines. As a consequence, 
improvements in the effi ciency of blast furnaces 
would have led to an enhancement in the value of 
the iron deposits of the region. Thus, there was a 
keen interest in the improvement of the average 
performance of blast furnaces, as only improve-
ments in the average performance would have 
infl uenced the value of iron deposits.
Following Allen’s work, other scholars have 
pointed out the existence of a collective-inven-
tion regime in other industries. In a recent study, 
Nuvolari (2004) has shown that the three condi-
tions of Allen’s model of collective invention 
were also at work in the Cornish community of 
steam engineers during the fi rst half of the 19th 
century. This case is particularly interesting be-
cause some evidence suggests that the emergence 
of the collective-invention regime was triggered 
by a widespread dissatisfaction toward the tradi-
tional model of innovation based on patents (in 
particular, James Watt’s patent of 1769). 
Other cases of collective invention have been 
noted in the historical literature, for example, 
the Western steamboat (Hunter, 1949) and the 
Lyon silk industry in the 19th century (Foray & 
Hilaire-Perez, 2000). Scholars have also noted 
similar knowledge-sharing episodes in several 
contemporary high-technology districts (most 
prominently in Silicon Valley; see Saxenian, 
1994). However, it is worth noting that in these 
cases, the very dense knowledge fl ows between 
fi rms may be due to user-producer interactions 
(Lundvall, 1988) or episodes of know-how trade 
between engineers (von Hippel, 1987) rather than 
to the existence of a collective-invention regime 
in Allen’s sense.2
A related stream of literature has highlighted 
the growing importance of user communities 
as sources of innovation (Franke & Shah, 2003; 
Shah, 2005). The starting point of these investi-
gations is the observation that in many fi elds, a 
sizable share of inventions is due to the users of a 
specifi c product and not to its manufacturers (von 
Hippel, 1988, 2005). One interesting feature of 
the innovation processes centered on users is that 
they are often based on very intense knowledge 
exchanges in the context of specifi c communities. 
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Again, within these communities, inventions are 
normally released in the public domain, and there 
are no attempts of exploiting them by means of 
exclusive property rights. Research in this fi eld 
(see Franke & Shah, 2003, for a detailed study of 
four user communities in sport equipment) has 
noted a variety of motivations for the emergence 
of this type of behavior. First, users belonging 
to these communities have a keen interest in the 
performance level of the product. Hence, as in 
the case of collective invention, the community 
seems to be characterized by a widespread belief 
that a mutual cooperative attitude toward inven-
tive activities will enhance the rate of innovation. 
Second, the social structure of these communities 
seems to favor the emergence of an ethos prescrib-
ing reciprocity and mutual aid.
Apart from the fi eld of sports equipment, in 
which this type of (user)  community-based in-
novation seems to be prominent, research has 
identifi ed the existence of this particular model 
in other industries, such as geographic informa-
tion systems, astronomic instruments, and early 
computer and automobile users (see Maurer & 
Scotchmer, 2006; Shah, 2005).
MAIN FOCUS OF THE CHAPTER
Open Source Software: A Synthesis 
of Recent Research
One of the main issues to be explored in order to 
understand the existence and the success of open 
source software can be stated as follows: Why are 
developers willing to develop open source soft-
ware if the typical licenses of this regime3 prevent 
them to extract any direct monetary gain from the 
diffusion of their work? In other words, a study of 
the open source software phenomenon requires an 
understanding of developers’ motivations. 
In order to describe the structure of the land-
scape of developers’ motivations, a fi rst useful 
distinction has been put forward by Lakhani and 
Wolf (2005). In this chapter, the authors, following 
the work by Deci and Ryan (1985), Amabile (1996), 
and Lindenberg (2001), classify the motivations 
driving developers’ participation into two main 
groups:  intrinsic and  extrinsic motivations. When 
the development activity is undertaken because it 
enhances developers’ utility directly, providing a 
gain in terms of fun or creativity fulfi llment, or a 
feeling of identity and belongingness to a group, 
the underlying incentives are said to be intrinsic 
because the actions they trigger have an intrinsic 
value for the agent. On the contrary, when the 
production of code is undertaken instrumentally 
to reach other goals, such as increasing wages, 
enhancing the agent’s reputation on the job market, 
or fulfi lling specifi c needs the existing software 
cannot satisfy, the motivations behind the action 
are defi ned as extrinsic because the increase in 
the individual utility is not due to action itself, 
but to its consequences.
Each one of the two regions of the devel-
opers’ motivational landscape can be further 
structured to isolate the different mechanisms at 
work in each fi eld. The FLOSS ( free/libre open 
source software) surveys developed by Ghosh, 
Krieger, Glott, and Robles (2002; answered by 
2,784 developers) and by David, Waterman, and 
Arora (2003; answered by 1,588 developers) offer 
a fi ner grain point of view on the motivational 
landscape. In both the surveys, the most popular 
answers to questions related to developers’ incen-
tives span from “I thought we should all be free 
to modify the software we use” to “As a user of 
free software, I wanted to give something back 
to the community,” “I saw it as a way to become 
a better programmer,” “to participate in a new 
form of cooperation,” “to improve OS/FS [open 
source/free software] products of other develop-
ers,” and “to improve my job opportunities.” 
Thus, a series of different intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations emerges. 
Lakhani and Wolf (2005; see also Lakhani, 
Wolf, Bates, & DiBona, 2002), using survey 
data collected from 684 developers working on 
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287 open source projects, were able, by means of 
a cluster analysis exercise, to identify a number 
of archetypical cases of open source software 
developers. They fi nd four clusters, each one ap-
proximately the same size as the others. For the 
members of the largest cluster, a personal sense 
of creativity and fun are crucial determinants of 
their contribution to the open source movement. 
Two other elements emerge as important in this 
group: the learning opportunities the community 
offers them, and the possibility to enhance their 
career through the diffusion of the code they 
produce. The population of the second cluster 
resembles the user communities described in 
the previous section: Skilled developers with 
specifi c needs the existing software cannot ful-
fi ll are pushed to create the program answering 
their needs (i.e., lead users). The third cluster is 
instead composed of paid developers who receive 
a wage connected to their production of open 
source products. Eventually, the fourth cluster 
gathers together individuals strongly committed 
to the community, moved by the willingness to 
reciprocate the received help and code, and hav-
ing a strong ideological position in favor of the 
open source movement (e.g., believing that code 
should be open and participating in order to beat 
proprietary software). 
From the empirical studies just described, some 
subsets of the two main motivation sets emerge. 
On the one hand, intrinsic motivation can have a 
psychological nature when it takes the form of fun 
or creativity fulfi llment (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005; 
Torvalds & Diamond, 2001), or a social nature 
when it is a product of the interaction between 
community members and between them and the 
whole social body of the community, that is, its 
culture, its shared rules, its ideology, its debate, 
and so on. In such a thick social environment, 
developers are willing to participate because they 
identify with the community, they belong to the 
hacker culture and feel the need to follow its rules, 
they believe in the common enterprise they are 
undertaking, or simply because they care about 
their status or reputation in the community and are 
sensitive to peers’ regard (Bagozzi & Dholakia, 
2006; Dalle & David, 2005; Dalle, David, Ghosh, 
& Wolak, 2004; Hertel, Niedner, & Hermann, 
2003; Himanen et al., 2001; Raymond, 1998; 
Weber, 2000, 2004; Zeitlyn, 2003). On the other 
hand, extrinsic motivations can be diversifi ed into 
subcategories such as career concerns (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2002), when developers’ production of code 
and diffusion is determined by the willingness 
to be recognized in the job market as valuable 
programmers; own use, when the open source 
community is conceived as a  user community 
à la von Hippel (Hertel et al., 2003; Jeppesen & 
Frederiksen, 2006; Lakhani & von Hippel, 2003; 
von Hippel, 2001); and paid contributions (Rob-
erts, Hann, & Slaughter, 2006), when developers 
are employees of fi rms active in the open source 
software environment.
A further element emerged from the cluster 
analysis by Lakhani and Wolf (2005): learning 
(von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). Developers 
are often driven by the desire to improve their 
skills and perceive the community as a social 
environment where they can get help in solving 
problems by studying collectively new solutions 
and fi nding new challenges. Learning can be 
considered both an intrinsic and an extrinsic 
incentive, and it cannot be placed easily in one 
of the subsets defi ned above. It certainly has an 
individual and psychological nature, but since 
it develops alongside the agents’ interaction, its 
nature is much broader. Once the open source 
community is conceived as a “ community of 
practice” or an “ epistemic community” (Cohen-
det, Creplet, & Dupouët, 2001; Lin, 2004), where 
the body of knowledge of the whole community 
interacts and coevolves with each individual’s 
knowledge, learning can be clearly identifi ed as 
a social process. The same blurred result can be 
found when conceiving learning as an extrinsic 
incentive: It can be an instrument for most of the 
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goals typical of the extrinsic motivations described 
above. Thus, it should be considered as a third 
group, intersecting all the previous sets. Figure 
1 shows the structure of the motivations set as 
drawn from the quoted literature.
The description of the community proposed 
above is mainly focused on developers as indi-
viduals. However, other subjects are active in 
the open source environment: fi rms. Even in an 
open environment as open source, it is possible 
for fi rms to generate profi ts. The most famous 
example is given by fi rms assembling and distribu-
tion a ready-to-install version of the GNU/Linux 
operating system, like Red Hat or Novell. The 
literature has highlighted several ways by which 
fi rms can create value from their participation in 
the open source movement, but has also shown 
the instrumental use of their adherence to the 
community norms and ideology (Rossi & Bonac-
corsi, 2005). In other words, as long as incentives 
are concerned, fi rms have a much narrower set of 
incentives, being motivated, as expected, by profi t 
maximization. However, even if the participation 
of the fi rms in the open source community is only 
instrumental, they play an increasingly important 
role in the open source scene. As we will see in 
the following sections, they can be fundamental 
sources of code or related services the community 
is not willing to produce. 
So far, we have given a brief account of the 
motivations sustaining developers’ production of 
open source software. However, even if developers 
can decide to dedicate a high amount of effort and 
time to the production of code, this does not mean 
that open source represents a successful model 
of innovation. Thus, our next step is to focus on 
the performance of open source software as an 
innovation model.
The fi rst thing to be noticed is that the dis-
tribution of open source projects in terms of the 
main performance indicators—the number of 
developers and forum or mailing-list discussions 
(Krishnamurthy, 2002), downloads (Healy & 
Schussman, 2003), and CVS (Concurrent Ver-
sion System) commits and fi le releases (Giuri, 
Ploner, Rullani, & Torrisi, 2005)—is extremely 
skewed. Most of the projects remain small indi-
vidual enterprises without a serious impact on the 
Figure 1. Structure of developers’ motivational landscape
Intrinsic motivations 
Lakhani and Wolf (2005)
Social incentives: Identity, social norms,
hacker culture, reciprocity (Bagozzi &
Dholakia, 2006; Dalle & David, 2005; Dalle
et al., 2004; Hertel et al., 2003; Himanen,
2001; Lindenberg, 2001; Raymond, 
1998; Weber, 2000, 2004; Zeitlyn, 2003)
Career concern (Lerner & Tirole, 2002)
Paid contribution (Roberts et al., 2006) 
Own use (Hertel et al., 2003; Jeppesen &
Frederiksen, 2006; von Hippel, 2003)
Extrinsic motivations 
Psychological incentives: Fun, creativity 
(Amabile, 1996; Lakhani & Wolf, 2005;
Torvalds & Diamond, 2001) Learning:
(Cohendet et al.,
2001; Lin, 2004;
von Hippel & von
Krogh, 2003)
  233
Curious Exceptions?
landscape of the software industry. However, as 
argued by David and Rullani (2006), open source 
software should be regarded as a “dissipative” 
system, burning more resources than those used 
to produce the actual results. This characteristic is 
typical of self-organized social structures, where 
individuals choose on a voluntary basis how much 
effort to devote to what task and when. In order 
for the whole system to produce an outcome, 
several combinations of the available resources 
have to be worked out before the valuable ones 
can be selected by the environment.
Thus, on the one hand, the disproportion be-
tween the inactive projects and the successful ones 
characterizes the open source model as dissipative 
rather than an unsuccessful model of innovation. 
On the other hand, the same argument calls for a 
defi nition of the drivers of open source projects 
performance in order to be able to reduce the gap 
between the mobilized resources and those that 
are actually used.
A fi rst result along this line of inquiry states 
that projects adopting a restrictive license like the 
GPL (General Public License) tend to have lower 
performance (Comino, Manenti, & Parisi, 2005; 
Fershtman & Gandal, 2004; see also Lerner & 
Tirole, 2005). This result could be due to a det-
rimental impact of the excessive openness of the 
GPL projects, which may be unable, for example, 
to attract fi rms and sponsored developers. A hybrid 
model of innovation, where the adopted license 
scheme is able to create a synergy between the 
community and other economic actors, should be 
then considered as a valuable confi guration (Bo-
naccorsi, Giannangeli, & Rossi, 2006). A second 
result is that the division of labor has a signifi cant 
positive impact on project performance. However, 
the variety and the level of members’ skill sets 
(Giuri et al., 2005) and the costs connected to 
the coordination of many developers (Comino et 
al., 2005) have to be taken into account in order 
to avoid a net negative effect. Modularity at the 
level of the code structure has been analyzed by 
Baldwin and Clark (2006), who fi nd that a modular 
architecture is able to attract more voluntary effort 
and reduce free riding. Applying an ecological 
perspective, Grewal, Lilien, and Mallapragada 
(2006) look at the developers’ membership in 
different projects to draw a network of relation-
ships between projects and developers. They 
show that projects with a central position in the 
network are more likely to exhibit high technical 
performance, but the network is not so crucial in 
determining the commercial success (i.e., number 
of downloads) of the produced software.
Having established what moves developers 
and what the drivers of the open source software 
innovative performance are, a last question regards 
the possibility to sustain such a structure over time. 
The contributions moving in this direction are 
scarce, and there is need for further research. A fi rst 
contribution has been given by Gambardella and 
Hall (in press). The authors show that a coordina-
tion device is needed to assure the stability of col-
laboration. The adoption of the GPL can be thought 
of as such a mechanism, preventing any developer 
joining the project after the founder to adopt op-
portunistic behavior. This argument points out 
an interesting trade-off between performance 
and  sustainability: Less restrictive licenses can 
induce higher performance, but can undermine 
the sustainability of the community. A second 
point has been made by David and Rullani (2006), 
showing that developers undertaking their activity 
on the SourceForge.net (http://sourceforge.net/) 
platform during the period of 2001 to 2002 exhibit 
a robust, nontransient tendency to participate in 
existing projects and also to create new projects. 
Sustainability, then, can be conceived at least as 
a valuable working hypothesis.
Open Technology and Open Source 
Software: A Comparison 
Various researchers have noted the existence of 
important parallels between the model of open 
technology discussed previously and the fi nd-
ings emerging from ongoing studies of the open 
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source communities (see, among others, Foray, 
2004; Nuvolari, 2005). In a nutshell, these are the 
main points of interest: 
a. Both collective-invention regimes and the 
open source movement seem to emerge 
thanks to a perceived dissatisfaction toward 
the innovative performance delivered by tra-
ditional regimes based on exclusive property 
rights.
b. Case studies of collective invention and user 
communities seem generally characterized 
by remarkable performances in terms of 
rates of innovation. The same remarkable 
innovative performance has characterized 
some open source software projects, at least 
since the 1990s, when GNU/Linux was 
born. 
c. However, only a restricted number of open 
source software projects are successful. 
Similarly, only few innovations coming from 
the users are really valuable, as well as only 
few contributions added to the common pool 
of collective inventions are really improv-
ing the performance of the sector. Thus, 
the models share the dissipative property 
described for the open source model of in-
novation.
d. Both collective invention and a number of 
open source software projects are charac-
terized by high levels of complexity and 
uncertainty. In these conditions, a model 
of innovation based on knowledge shar-
ing, cooperation, and continuous feedback 
permits the timely identifi cation of the most 
promising lines of development. 
e. Cases of collective invention, user-based in-
novation models, and open source software 
are forms of innovation processes involving 
heterogeneous sets of actors (in particular, 
engineers, lead users, and developers with 
different skills and talents, and fi rms) orga-
nized into communities.
f. Collective invention, open source software, 
and user communities rely on a complex 
set of motivational drivers, spanning from 
economic incentives, dissatisfaction toward 
tight intellectual property-rights regimes, 
psychological and social motives, and so 
on. Even if the open source software and 
the other examples of open innovation 
seem to rely on different compositions of 
the aforementioned motivational factors, it 
might well be that this plurality of motives 
represents one of the fundamental ingre-
dients for sustaining both open source and 
open-technology regimes.
CONCLUSION 
The Core of the Difference and the 
Challenges to Sustainability 
The main difference between the three regimes 
of innovation can be found in the relationship 
between the communities of innovative agents 
and the involved fi rms. In a collective-invention 
regime, fi rms strategically suspend appropriation 
of the produced knowledge in order to deal with 
technological problems that an individual fi rm 
could not handle. In this sense, fi rms are the fun-
damental actors of collective-invention regimes. 
Accordingly, these regimes usually disappear 
when the collective effort to overcome the radical 
uncertainty in the technological space is not neces-
sary anymore (i.e., when a specifi c technological 
trajectory or paradigm emerges; Dosi, 1982), and 
each fi rm is willing to return to the proprietary 
regime that will assure higher individual profi ts. 
On the contrary, the nexus between manufacturers 
and users is much tighter in user communities. 
Users innovate around the products of the fi rms, 
which in turn try to sustain users’ involvement. 
Sometimes, these communities are originated 
directly by the fi rms, and other times they emerge 
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spontaneously through users’ interaction. In the 
open source software case, the leading role is 
instead played by users and developers, and fi rms 
are mainly active in those spaces that the com-
munity does not or cannot reach. Firms have to 
adapt to the rules of the community and do not 
directly control on the product (Dahlander & 
Magnusson, 2005; Shah, 2006). Thus, the basic 
difference between the three models of innovation 
is in the balance between the roles of fi rms and 
of users and developers.
These considerations shed new light on the 
relative sustainability of these regimes. Collec-
tive inventions can exist only as long as fi rms do 
not profi t enough from a traditional proprietary 
regime; this happens mostly in conditions of radi-
cal technological uncertainty (emerging phases 
of a novel technological paradigm). Instead, user 
communities and open source software seem to 
be characterized by different sustainability condi-
tions (Osterloh & Rota, 2005). The sustainability 
of the former depends directly on the ability of 
communities and fi rms to involve individual us-
ers and keep their participation at a certain level; 
in the case of the latter, several factors, still to 
be fully identifi ed, can induce a decay of the 
phenomenon or strengthen its sustainability. The 
foregoing discussion on the trade-offs between 
open source sustainability, performance, and level 
of openness (as defi ned by the license) clearly 
bears out this point. 
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KEY TERMS
 Collective Invention: An innovation model 
in which private fi rms engaged in the produc-
tion or use of a specifi c good freely share one 
another’s inventions and other pertinent technical 
information.  
 Dissipation: We call dissipation an innovation 
model that mobilizes (or “burns”) more resources 
than those actually used to produce the outcome. 
Dissipation is typical of self-organizing and ex-
plorative organizations. 
 Intrinsic/ Extrinsic Motivations: When an 
activity is undertaken because it enhances agents’ 
utility directly, the underlying incentives are in-
trinsic because the actions they trigger have an 
intrinsic value for the agent. On the contrary, when 
an action is undertaken instrumentally to reach 
other goals, the motivations behind the action are 
defi ned as extrinsic because the increase of the 
individual’s utility is not due to action itself, but 
to its consequences.
 Sustainability: We call sustainable an innova-
tion model that re-creates over time the premises 
for its own reproduction, that is, if it is endowed 
with a mechanism able to re-create incentives for 
the participants to continually invest in innova-
tion. In this sense, the patent system as well as the 
public-funded research system can be conceived 
as sustainable. 
 User Community: An innovation model 
where a community of users of a particular prod-
uct are the main source of innovation and where 
innovations are normally freely shared within 
the community.
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ENDNOTES
1 Another term that is becoming increasingly 
popular in the management literature is 
“open innovation” (see Chesbrough, Van-
haverbeke, & West, 2006). The concept of 
open innovation refers to the fact that fi rms 
are increasingly making use of external 
sources of knowledge in their innovation 
processes. Clearly, this is somewhat related 
to the phenomenon of open technology 
sketched above as fi rms, in order to gain 
access to these external sources, are fre-
quently required to adopt a more relaxed 
attitude toward the appropriation of their 
inventions. In this chapter, we will not deal 
with the literature on open innovation.   
2 In know-how trading, information is typi-
cally exchanged by engineers belonging 
to competing fi rms on a bilateral basis. In 
collective-invention regimes, all the compet-
ing fi rms have free access to the potentially 
proprietary know-how. 
3 The possibility for subsequent developers 
to change the open regime established by 
the initial choice of an open source license 
depends on the terms of each specifi c li-
cense. We refer the reader to Lerner and 
Tirole (2005) for a futher discussion on the 
different types of licenses.
